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This paper focuses on the involvement and management of spontaneous volunteers. It 
develops a new theory – which we call the ‘involvement/exclusion’ paradox – about a 
situation which is frequently manifested when spontaneous volunteers converge in times of 
disaster.  After reviewing research and policy guidance relating to spontaneous volunteering, 
we present findings from a study of responses to winter flood episodes in England. Taking 
together the empirical findings and the literature, the paper analyses elements inherent in the 
involvement/exclusion paradox and develops a conceptual model to illustrate and explain the 
paradox. Implications for managers and future research are discussed. 
  
Introduction 
Although there is now a well-established body of national and international research on 
voluntarism and volunteering, studies have mostly focused either on ‘informal’ forms of 
volunteering (between family, friends, neighbours and associational members) or on ‘formal’ 
volunteering (under the auspices of organisations and projects) (Lee and Brudney, 2012; 
Wilson, 2012).  Less scholarly attention has been paid to ‘spontaneous’ forms of volunteering 
which are not readily categorised as either ‘informal’ or ‘formal’.  
Spontaneous volunteers (also called ‘convergent’ or ‘unaffiliated’ volunteers) are people 
who, although not affiliated to ‘official’ non-profit or governmental response organisations, 
arrive to provide unpaid help at the time of sudden unplanned events, often disasters (1) 
(Fernandez et al., 2006). They rarely have specialized training for responding to the event and 
they may, or may not, have relevant expertise (Drabek and McEntire, 2003). Anecdotal 
examples include people arriving with their own small boats to aid flood victims, people 
searching for missing persons, people wanting to clear debris after earthquakess, and people 
offering to give blood.  
As spontaneous volunteering (SV) mostly occurs at times of ‘unplanned’ events, it is a 
transient phenomenon and may not be formally recorded.  Thus there are barriers to studying 
it systematically. This paper seeks to expand knowledge about SV by focusing on the 
contradictory imperatives which underlie it.  Spontaneous volunteers (SVs) can be both 
needed and, simultaneously, not wanted by disaster managers; a phenomenon that we 
discovered through this research and call the ‘involvement/exclusion paradox’.  
We present an empirical study of one kind of disaster situation: responses to winter flood 
episodes in England.  Images of flooded homes and streets drive empathy and helping 
impulses.  Simultaneously, ‘official responders’ (ORs) can rarely meet all needs due to the 
overwhelming demand.   Yet while SVs offer an additional resource for those managing a 
flood response, they may also pose risks (some life-threatening) to themselves and to those 
they intend to help (Sauer et al., 2014).  They may, for example, be unaware of the need for 
protective footwear and clothing; of the need to keep informed about changing conditions; or 
of the invisible risks posed by contaminated water and dislodged manhole covers.  Thus what 
we newly identify as ‘the paradox of spontaneous volunteering’  –  helpers wanting to be 
involved, juxtaposed with pressures for managers to exclude them – is manifested intensively 
in this kind of high hazard situation, although it occurs in many disaster situations. 
The English Winter Floods Response Study (WFRS) on which this paper draws was 
commissioned by the National Government’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA). It aimed to describe and analyse the issues surrounding the involvement of 
SVs by exploring the perspectives of volunteers themselves as well as flood response 
managers.   
The paper begins with a review of research relating to spontaneous volunteers.  After 
outlining the WFRS research approach, it presents our findings about involving SVs during 
winter flooding. Taking together the empirical findings and the literature, the paper analyses 
elements inherent in the involvement/exclusion paradox and proposes a new conceptual 
model to illustrate and explain the paradox. Implications for disaster response managers and 
for future research conclude the paper. 
Earlier Literature  
Here we first describe what the literature tells us about spontaneous volunteering and 
volunteers.  This leads to us consider previous research on the role of SVs in a community 
context and their involvement alongside officials in disaster response and recovery. We 
synthesise these literatures to highlight the paradox which is the focus of this paper.  
What is Spontaneous Volunteering? 
Four terms are commonly used in the literature to refer to the phenomenon which is the focus 
of this paper: ‘spontaneous volunteering’; ‘convergent volunteering’; ‘unaffiliated 
volunteering’; and ‘walk-in volunteering’.  All four terms are applied to transient behaviour 
in which, as described by Britton (1991, p. 405), individuals voluntarily “come together for 
the first time to pursue a specific task or series of related tasks prompted by changing, often 
unexpected, situations requiring immediate action.”  Cone et al. (2003, p.457) refer to “the 
arrival of unexpected or uninvited personnel wishing to render aid”, a definition reflecting the 
idea of spontaneity as well as ‘convergence’; and Fernandez et al. (2006, p.58) refer to “those 
who are not with an assigned resource and have not been specifically recruited”, a definition 
which reflects the idea of being ‘unaffiliated’ to formal response organisations.  Drabek & 
McEntire (2003) talk of “unaffiliated individuals” who may or may not have relevant 
training, skills or experience.  The underlying idea of spontaneous volunteering is memorably 
encapsulated in the phrase ‘they will come’ (as in Schwarzenegger and Renteria, 2001)  
By its nature, most spontaneous volunteering occurs in unplanned situations where citizens 
are drawn to help, and in which helping activities can incur risks to volunteers themselves 
and to those they intend to help (Points of Light Foundation, n.d.).  SV is conceptually 
distinct from the activities of volunteers affiliated with, and managed by, formal non-profits; 
and distinct from activities by paid personnel conducted under the formal auspices of non-
profit, governmental or business organisations (Baxter-Tomkins and Michelle, 2009). It is 
also conceptually distinct from interventions by ‘bystanders’ who respond to an immediate 
situation because they happen to be there and who are involved only briefly (Darley and 
Latane, 1968). 
The literature also suggests conceptual distinctions between different kinds of non-affiliated 
helpers or volunteers.  Some want to help but want to ‘do their own thing’ and remain 
separate from any formal or ‘official’ responses (Lavine and Thompson, 2004) whereas 
others do positively want to cooperate with ‘official’ response organisations (British Red 
Cross, 2010).  Finally there are those who want to respond to an unexpected occurrence by 
banding together with others, informally (Stallings and Quarentelli, 1985).  
Who are Spontaneous Volunteers? 
Spontaneous volunteers are driven by a variety of impulses.   Many are driven by a 
commitment to their local community (Milofsky, 2013).  Others may seek to turn negative 
impacts into something more positive (Lowe & Fothergill, 2003); a point which reflects 
broader volunteering literature which suggests that volunteering can help people to recover 
from disasters (Rotolo & Berg, 2010). 
As regards characteristics of spontaneous volunteers, Michel (2007) found in a study of the 
response to Hurricane Katrina, that sense of self-efficacy, level of education, religious service 
attendance and organisational membership all drove feelings of personal responsibility to 
help victims.  Rotolo & Berg’s (2010) analysis of nationally representative US data found 
that those volunteering for disaster relief tasks were likely to be younger and less educated 
than volunteers in general.  Fritz & Matthewson (1957) distinguished five types of disaster 
volunteers: ‘returnees’, survivors who return to help neighbours; ‘the anxious’ e.g. those 
searching for missing people; ‘informal helpers’, unrecorded by managers; ‘the curious’ (also 
Wolensky, 1979); and ‘exploiters’ motivated by personal gain.   
 
 
The Role of Spontaneous Volunteers in a Community Context 
Although not necessarily referring specifically to spontaneous volunteering, community and 
citizenship literatures are relevant here because they look beyond the individual to collective 
behaviour, seeing volunteering as an expression of community involvement and civil 
engagement (Forbes and Zampelli, 2012) or a response to a ‘vacuum of authority’ which can 
occur in times of disaster (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1980).  People often engage in collective 
behaviour based upon a local consensus about what needs are not being met by formal 
governmental and non-profit agencies that constitute the ‘official’ response to a disaster.   
(Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985). Conversely, formal nonprofits and other ‘official’ responders 
can be dependant for their effectiveness on the local knowledge and capacities which 
community organisations can contribute (Coles et al., 2012; Coston et al., 1993).  The links 
and interdependence between local communities and official responders become particularly 
important when a surge capacity is required to provide a weight of response that is not 
available locally from official response sources (Shaw et al., 2015). 
Looking at how local residents respond to disasters, the literature employs the concepts of 
‘community resilience’ and ‘community adaptive capacity’; the ability to self-organise and 
adapt (Shaw et al., 2014). The capacity to respond is influenced by local factors such as 
breadth and depth of personal networks and relationships (Milofsky, 2013) and the prior 
accumulation of social capital through associational behaviour (Pelling and High, 2006).   
The community learning which can occur through experiences of cooperation in response to 
disasters can further contribute to the building of social capital and civil society and thus 
impact positively on future disaster responses (Steffen and Fothergill, 2009).  Conversely, 
managers deterring people from spontaneous helping (even if justified as concern about 
hazards) can ultimately have a negative effect, diminishing community resilience (Nichols et 
al., 2014; Tierney, 2003).  Deterring people who want to help can also lead to ‘freelancing’; 
independent actions uncoordinated (and potentially conflicting) with ‘official’ responses 
(Cone et al., 2003). 
Spontaneous Volunteering and ‘Official’ Disaster Response 
The literature on disasters also provides insights relevant to behaviour during unplanned 
events.   Most countries have established procedures for dealing with disasters involving 
networks of formal governmental and non-profit organisations and extensive pre-planning 
(Waugh and Streib, 2006).  Such networks may be characterised by standard operating 
procedures, centralised authority, reluctance to trust information from outside the network, 
drives to minimise risk, and reluctance to collaborate with unknown people or organisations 
(Vigoda, 2002).  The networks might include ‘permanent disaster volunteers’ (Britton, 1991) 
but these are not ‘spontaneous volunteers’; rather they are people who are prepared, trained 
and managed by a formal organisation, usually a non-profit.  
Within the context of established networks and procedures for disaster response, reactions by 
official responders to spontaneous volunteers tend to be cautious; SVs are seen as outsiders, 
whose qualifications, skills, background and capacity are unknown and whose credentials 
cannot be reliably verified (Drabek & McEntire, 2003).  It may be thought that if their 
convergence is not managed, they will overwhelm management resources (Kendra and 
Wachtendorf, 2003; Quarentelli, 1989). In fact, they might hinder rather than help the official 
response (Barskey et al., 2007).  From this perspective, they need to be discouraged from 
involvement.  
The drive to manage risk (JRF, 2014) is a key reason why ORs may be reluctant to allow 
SVs’ involvement.  In disasters, there may indeed be major risks to volunteers.  They may be 
faced with high hazard situations (Cadieux, 2014) or exposed to distressing events and sights.  
They may be subject to burn-out through overwork combined with lack of support (Jaffe et 
al., 2012). Dyregrov et al. (1996) argue that the psychological effects of disaster volunteering 
may persist longer in untrained volunteers as compared with prepared ones.  More positively, 
however, the literature also suggests that disaster volunteering can be life-enhancing for 
volunteers, leading to the development of new careers or continued community involvement 
(Clucky, 2010; Steffan & Fothergill, 2009).  
The tendency for ORs to treat SVs with caution, can be set alongside the finding that 
disasters can place significant strain on the capacity of ‘official’ response organisations to 
meet the needs of those affected (Drabek & McEntire,2003; Quarantelli, 1989). Moreover, 
volunteers can bring different skills and response ideas which have the potential to free up 
ORs’ time for other activities (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003) and thereby extend the 
‘official’ response (Fritz & Mathewson,1957).  
These conflicting pressures on ORs to involve and exclude spontaneous volunteers, have led 
some authors to argue for a more coordinated and flexible approach to responding to disasters 
(Nolte & Boenigk, 2013; Points of Light Foundation, n.d).  Penning-Rowsell et al. (2006) 
suggest that responses should combine government-led interventions designed to protect 
human and natural environments, alongside self-help behaviour from individuals and 
communities.  Waugh and Streib (2006, p.138) argue that “No one can ever have complete 
control; it is not possible to fully command attention or to compel compliance”. Thus, in 
practice, emergent groups and SVs may become part of the overall response.   
The Paradox of Spontaneous Volunteering 
When the literature on SV and community capacity on the one hand, and on response to 
disasters on the other hand, are juxtaposed, the paradox introduced at the start of this paper, is 
sharply revealed.  In such situations there is often a need for personnel and other resources 
additional to those that can be provided by ORs, from governmental agencies and rescue non-
profits (Chikito et al., 2012). And there is often a cohort of SVs who want to help and are 
encouraged to do so by politicians, media, and community figures (e.g. Cameron, 2014). So, 
potentially, spontaneous volunteers are a means through which the gap between demand and 
supply of disaster responses can be filled. Yet, paradoxically, there remain numerous 
pressures on ORs to deter or exclude SVs, especially in high hazard situations.   
Winter Floods Study Context 
The organisational framework that operates for flooding in England is multi-layered with 
National Government setting policy through DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs) combined with devolution of responsibilities to localities. The Flood 
Water Management Act of 2010 extended DEFRA’s working relationship with other national 
governmental agencies. In practice this means management from the centre with the 
government controlling national resources such as flood high volume pump resources 
operated by the Fire and Rescue Services. Responsibility for operational control is devolved 
to Local Resilience Forums which coordinate local resources.  Thus various forms of 
governance, resources, control and scrutiny - operating at the national and local level - shape 
the roles and responsibilities of ORs (Official Responders). 
The English Winter Floods Response Study (WFRS) on which this paper draws, was 
commissioned by DEFRA which was seeking research-based advice on the involvement of 
SVs in the response to, and recovery from, disasters such as floods. In England, volunteers 
are trained and equipped to participate in the (public sector) Fire and Rescue Service, the 
Police, Ambulance and military activities.  They are also recruited and trained to work in and 
with rescue nonprofits such as the British Red Cross and the Royal National Lifeboat 
Institution, at both the national and local level. Thus volunteers are already embedded in 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations which respond to disasters. Yet interest in 
the involvement of spontaneous volunteers in flood situations only came to prominence in 
2011 following several major flood episodes (Shaw et al., 2015).   
Study Approach 
Our study took an interpretive approach; aiming to explore the issues surrounding SV by 
gathering perspectives of spontaneous volunteers, as well as those who officially manage 
flood responses (ORs).  In this paper we draw primarily on the second stage of the WFRS in 
which semi-structured interviews were conducted with 50 participants: with SVs (13 
interviews) and people who may manage SVs such as disaster responders (21 interviews) and 
representatives of non-profits (16 interviews).  All interviewees had experienced at least one 
major flood episode.  
Interviewees were identified using the snowball method and selected such that they varied 
with respect to their experiences of flood situations.  Interviews lasted approximately 30 
minutes, were conducted face-to-face or by telephone and were audio- recorded with 
interviewees’ permission.  
The interview schedule covered topics including allocation of tasks and working practices in 
flood situations; SV supervision; and collaboration between SVs and ORs.  Interviewees 
were encouraged to express views about possible changes to practice.   
Data Analysis 
Using interview transcripts, the qualitative data were first analysed to discover their emergent 
properties through ‘cognitive mapping’ (similar to mind mapping) (Shaw et al., 2009) which 
ensured consistency in the way data were treated. This was done by the research team in a 
series of workshops in which initial themes were identified and defined as well as their 
relationships to other themes. To maintain rigor in analysis we then applied a coding 
technique to the transcripts (Gioia et al., 2012). Often referred to as ‘inductive concept 
development technique’ the process is drawn from Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) modified 
version of grounded theory.   
First, we applied open coding to interview transcripts to identify recurring themes.  Second, 
axial coding was used to identify higher-level categories by grouping together related open 
codes. The axial codes were interrogated, removing overlapping categories and identifying 
core codes.  This was done by two investigators who independently worked with the 
interview material to develop their own classifications. Then a third investigator worked 
across both of their results to seek commonalities for the whole dataset and balance those 
with their own reading of the research data.  There was strong commonality across the data 
and the consistency of the findings from the different investigators built confidence in the 
validity of the emergent themes. In keeping with ‘theoretical saturation’ (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), this continued until no new themes emerged from the data. These core codes were 
considered in relation to the findings from the cognitive mapping.  
For the purposes of this paper, findings from interviews with responders and voluntary 
organisation representatives are presented together and referred to as responses from ‘ORs’; 
that is, we distinguish simply between the perspectives of those with experience of being part 
of the ‘official’ response to flood situations and those with experience of being SVs.  
Findings from the Winter Floods Response Study 
Findings from interviews with SVs and ORs are presented in this section around four themes, 
as shown in Figure 1. First, we present results on why SVs get involved in flood situations. 
Then we present what happens to SVs when they volunteer and the challenges confronted by 
managers of SVs. We conclude the section with findings on how SV involvement in disaster 
response and recovery might be increased.  We illustrate key points with verbatim quotes in 
italics. Quotes not marked ‘SV’ are from ORs. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
1. Why Spontaneous Volunteers get Involved in Flood Situations 
SVs expressed a range of reasons for getting involved during flood episodes.  Many 
empathised with those who had been affected; they had experienced flooding themselves or 
could imagine being in a similar situation: “I felt so awful with it being Christmas … just 
thought that would be really, really horrible if it happened to us …” [SV].  For some, their 
empathy was for people they knew: “people that live down there are my friends” [SV].  
Others had a more generalised commitment to the local community: “I wanted to put 
something back in the community” [SV]. Some SVs had become involved in response to a 
direct request (in person, by telephone or social media) or after seeing others getting 
involved, so there was an element of social pressure behind their involvement: “I thought that 
I should lend a hand since other people were” [SV]. A note of resentment was reflected in 
some SV interviews; they had been driven to compensate for what they saw as inadequate 
responses of ‘official’ agencies, including fire and police services.   
SVs varied in what they had hoped to achieve through their volunteering.  Some simply 
wanted to help those affected by floods to ‘normalise’ their lives: “to try and make it as easy 
as possible to get the stuff out and then start rebuilding” [SV].  Others wanted to build 
‘community spirit’ by getting local people together to do necessary tasks: “trying to help as a 
community base to get the people to try and help one another” [SV] so that “If there are 
going to be problems with flooding in the future … people are more resilient, more self-
prepared, more aware” [SV].   
2. What Happens to Spontaneous Volunteers when they Volunteer? 
Initial responses by ORs to SVs varied widely between and within flood situations.  Some 
thought that the way SVs get treated on first arrival tends to be “a lottery”.   Some SVs were 
rapidly integrated into the official response because they were known to formal nonprofits 
such as the Red Cross, or as community leaders: “they were recognised people within the 
community who had particular roles with the community”.   There were also several 
examples of SVs being excluded from the flood area for safety reasons, or being passed on by 
ORs to generalist volunteer-involving organisations outside the flood-affected area. 
Between these extremes of rapidly drawing SVs into ‘front line’ involvement or deflection of 
SVs to other agencies and areas, we were told of SVs being drawn into low-risk tasks; for 
example, cleaning a rest centre, helping with completion of insurance claim forms, serving 
refreshments, providing local knowledge to ORs, and securing donations in kind from local 
businesses.  Where SVs were drawn into physical activities linked to the flooding, these were 
also mostly lower-risk; for example filling-sandbags, clearing flooded properties or ferrying 
people by road to places of safety.   
The preference of many ORs was to involve SVs later in the ‘recovery’ phase, rather than at 
the time of the initial flooding: “Drying out the homes, getting rid of their sodden furniture 
and alternative accommodation for themselves or their pets”.   The challenge then became to 
keep the SVs motivated so that would respond to being recalled: “… that’s the concern really 
is finding jobs for people to do when actually what we need to do is put them on standby 
during a response so that they can help in the flood recovery because lots of people will need 
help then.” 
In fact, examples of SV involvement in the recovery phase of a flood were more usually cited 
than examples of immediate involvement at the start. This capitalised on the upsurge of 
helping motivations whilst minimising risk by allowing time for establishing confidence in 
SVs’ abilities and even some minimal training.  Some initial SVs were later drawn into task 
forces of local people who took over recovery activities after the departure of official disaster 
responders.  Others were drawn into providing services to help with daily life after the initial 
flooding, for example providing transport for medical appointments. 
3. Challenges for Managers of Spontaneous Volunteers  
Although responsibility for managing SVs in flood situations varies according to area and 
local resources, a number of common problems around the management of SVs were 
identified by interviewees.   
A primary concern of OR managers was risks to SVs, since they were unlikely to have had 
training about the hazards posed by flood waters.  OR managers wanted to inform SVs about 
potential hazards; to match SVs to appropriate tasks; and to exclude people who were not 
appropriately clothed or who they judged to be otherwise unsuitable.  In short, if they were 
going to involve SVs, ORs wanted to have in place suitable selection, training and 
management structures.  As one interviewee put it: “because if they do just get on and do it 
we’ll end up with more bodies to rescue”.   ORs also wanted to avoid the consequences of 
SVs putting themselves at risk; for example criticism from politicians or on social media.  
Interviewees from formal nonprofits were concerned about reputational damage should their 
organisations be associated with SVs having accidents, behaving inappropriately, or making 
complaints in social media.   
Several interviewees pointed to the delicate balance when managing SVs.  “We want 
volunteers to feel they are actually bringing something to the community and doing 
something worthwhile ... but we don’t want them to overstep the mark, to feel they can 
undertake more than their role actually allows them to do.”  On the one hand ORs wanted to 
minimise risk but, on the other hand, ORs were keen to encourage community response.  
A second management challenge concerned communication with emergent groups of SVs.  In 
flood situations, groups of SVs tend to emerge and re-form rapidly, coordinated by SVs 
themselves and often using social media: “we got a lot of people on board very very quickly – 
we sort of took on a control and command perspective, myself and an ex-army colleague” 
[SV].  Self-organising groups were to some extent welcomed by ORs who were thereby 
relieved of some organisational burdens.  Simultaneously, such groups posed additional 
difficulties for them and a drain on limited resources - in coordinating efforts with the overall 
disaster response. Sometimes these difficulties were intensified as tensions arose between and 
within SV groups: “personal power struggles and groups splitting into splinter groups and 
then reforming in different shapes and names. 
Another challenge for managers was around maintaining links with SVs once they were 
assigned, or found themselves, tasks.  Whereas volunteers associated with formal nonprofits 
generally operate within set structures and procedures, responsibility for management of SVs 
can be unclear and pose challenges for both SVs and ORs.  Several ways of meeting this 
challenge were mentioned by interviewees, the most effective of which was thought to be to 
draw SVs into the procedures and structures of official response organisations; for example, 
providing identifying clothing, daily briefings in a designated venue, clear working periods, 
two-way radio communication, and dedicated social media sites.  On the other hand, some 
overstretched OR managers had given up trying to integrate SVs; the effort needed to control 
SVs and integrate them into the broader official response was beyond their capacity; yet they 
did not want to discourage enthusiasm to help, so they simply left them to pursue their own 
goals: “there was an inability to control them so we let them move the sand to keep them 
busy”.  
For managers who were involved with overall coordination of an official response, a key 
challenge was the possibility of SVs taking initiatives without having knowledge of priorities 
or of what tasks had already been allocated: “If we turn someone away and they really do 
want to help, the likelihood is they are going to freelance and that is the last thing we want 
them doing”.   
Some SVs were happy to be incorporated into the official response and managed accordingly; 
others were less positive.  Some were resentful about being given unskilled or, what they 
thought of as, uninteresting tasks.  Others reported ‘tensions’ between themselves and 
volunteers deployed by non-profit and voluntary organisations.  Close supervision by 
managers (often the corollary of concerns about risk) made some feel untrusted.  Others 
recoiled from the idea of being incorporated into the official flood response: “I would 
actually rather be a volunteer rather than an official kind of thing because then nobody can 
say to me ‘oh, you’ve broken our rules’” [SV]. 
Underpinning responses from ORs about SVs’ involvement in flood response, were not only 
concerns about risks, communication and coordination, but also a pragmatic challenge around 
the costs (money and management time) of involving SVs.  Many OR interviewees were 
aware that volunteers are not cost-free; they come with costs of equipment, training, 
communication and management.  In the case of SVs, they might also bring additional 
insurance-related costs, reputational risks and the cost of deflected management time: “We 
were concerned about pressure of resources locally and how best people’s skills and 
experience that they had to offer could be used and matched.”    
Yet many managers were also concerned about the ‘opportunity cost’ of not involving SVs 
immediately upon their convergence; it was feared that they may either ‘freelance’ (as above) 
with consequent risks to themselves and to the overall response effort;  that they may 
publicise their dissatisfaction through social media; or they may be disillusioned and not 
willing to help at a later stage of recovery:  “because if people turn up and then you’re doing 
nothing with them … they’re going to get grumpy, they’re going to tweet about it … then 
you’re managing a media problem”.   
4. Scope for Increasing Spontaneous Volunteer Involvement  
Based on their experiences, SVs and ORs interviewees offered suggestions for increasing SV 
involvement in future flood episodes. One suggestion was for disaster planners to recognise 
the distinctive contributions that could be made by SVs, rather than trying to incorporate 
them into the ‘official’ flood response.   Examples were given of tasks for which SVs could 
be uniquely well qualified such as “being eyes and ears on the ground”; communicating to 
ORs what was happening to properties; and tracking needs in a fast-changing situation: “We 
could do a lot more with using people’s local knowledge of their neighbours and checking in 
on each other”.  Additionally, SVs could draw down resources which were not as accessible 
to ORs; getting donations of cleaning equipment from local businesses for example.   
Another suggested approach to involving SVs was for ORs to positively anticipate the 
probable arrival of SVs when developing local emergency and disaster plans: “try and get 
ahead of the volunteers and give them something to volunteer for”.  For example, ORs could 
have information and training materials prepared for SVs along with identifying badges and 
clothing.  Particular locations could be advertised as places for SVs to converge, to be briefed 
and collect resources such as sandbags: “provide them with venues to come to so that that hub 
becomes the visible rendezvous point that SVs recognise”[SV]. Planning could also include 
selection and management of SVs as one of the training topics for official responders. 
Responsibility for matching SV skills to tasks could be a pre-assigned role, implementing 
plans  for registering them, ascertaining qualifications and keeping track of their 
whereabouts.   
A step further from positively anticipating the arrival of SVs would be, it was suggested, to 
map out beforehand, key local voluntary groupings including faith-based groups, which could 
be approached to help with rapid mobilisation of additional volunteers in times of disasters.  
Another suggestion for simultaneously encouraging and controlling the convergence of 
volunteers was for ORs to put out media messages quickly, specifying what help was needed 
where, and what qualifications and equipment were wanted: “put media briefings out to say if 
you want to come and help can you please turn up at this location” and “if you want to bring 
a boat, the sort of boat we need would be …”. 
Alongside these suggestions, which recognised the special contributions that SVs could 
make, OR respondents made suggestions which in effect involved ‘converting’ SVs into 
regular volunteers under the auspices and control of the disaster response agencies or formal 
voluntary organisations.  For example, it was suggested that people could be trained 
beforehand to be ‘flood wardens’ and security checked and so: “you’ve got some form of 
recognition that people can say ‘yes you are a registered volunteer’” [SV].  ‘Converting’ 
SVs in this way was seen as a positive response to issues of ‘command and control’ and to 
concerns about insurance cover for those who were not an unambiguous part of an official 
response.  
SVs were generally keen to see the creation of local flood-prepared groups of volunteers: “It 
would be nice if there were a group of people that would be ready to respond” [SV].   Yet 
SV interviewees generally had different perspectives from ORs on how SVs could be used 
more effectively.  They thought that social media and local radio could be used to draw 
volunteers to the places where they were most needed and to make clear which skills and 
equipment were wanted.  They also wanted communication between SVs and ORs to be 
much more of a two-way process of information exchange.  
OR interviewees, were generally keen that there should be national and local level guidance 
about involving SVs: “to put some boundaries around expectations on volunteers [SVs] and 
expectations on organisations that need to work with [spontaneous] volunteers.”  Such 
guidance, it was felt, should be flexible and not too authoritative as it had to recognise how 
different flood situations and local situations can be.  Caution would also be needed to ensure 
that flexible guidance did not become required policy: “because if they put out guidance it 
becomes suddenly not guidance any more, it becomes the manual of ‘this is how you must do 
it’ ”.  Generally OR respondents felt that it was important for more thought to be given to 
how best to involve SVs in disaster situations: “they’re so important and so vital that we have 
to … put in a lot of effort between events”. 
Discussion  
This paper has explored the ‘involvement/exclusion’ paradox of SV, particularly in high 
hazard situations such as floods.  Broadly, the paradox is one in which people who want to be 
involved in responding to an unplanned event can face numerous pressures for their 
exclusion, even when there is, objectively, a need for the help that they are offering and the 
resources they can contribute.  The paradox is essentially about how ‘official’ responders’ 
and those who converge without prior planning relate to one another. 
In this discussion section we consider how our study has expanded earlier knowledge by 
exploring reasons for ORs’ caution about SVs as well as the perspectives of SVs themselves.  
We then propose a conceptual model to illustrate and explain the elements which, our study 
suggests, contribute to the paradox.  We offer some practical implications for managers in 
flood and other disaster situations, and conclude with thoughts about future research. 
1. Findings and Earlier Knowledge 
Our findings amplify earlier literature.  As regards the motivations of SVs, our study 
suggested a strong element of community attachment in spontaneous volunteering. In fact, it 
seems the inclusion/exclusion paradox reflects a tension between community-focused 
assumptions of spontaneous volunteers and the disaster-response focus of OR managers (a 
point we return to in the next section).  Empathy for friends and neighbours are important 
motivators for SVs in local situations, alongside occasional perceptions that ‘official’ 
responders are not sufficiently effective (as Dynes and Quarantelli, 1980; Lowe and 
Fothergill, 2003).  
That ORs tend to be risk averse (Drabek and McEntire, 2003; JRF, 2014) was also confirmed 
by our findings.  But we found that this was driven not only by concerns for the safety of 
volunteers and flood victims but also by concerns about reputational risks and awareness that 
involving volunteers is not cost-free. We also found that, despite concerns about risks, many 
ORs were keen to draw in the resources of local communities, especially to capitalise on their 
local knowledge and contacts and their self-organising capabilities (as Milofsky, 2013; 
Pelling and High, 2006). Thus generally there was a sense amongst ORs of being pulled 
between different management imperatives in response to the convergence of SVs; that is 
they were generally aware of the paradox surrounding SV involvement.       
We found examples of two extreme ways of resolving conflicting pressures experienced by 
ORs: full incorporation of SVs into the official response, or their complete exclusion.  This 
resolved the paradox by abolishing it.  But many interviewees recounted more flexible 
responses such as identifying tasks that utilised the local knowledge and networks of SVs so 
that they had a distinct role in the response process.  Both ORs and SVs made further 
suggestions for responding to the paradox including anticipating the arrival of SVs as part of 
official response planning; utilising offices of local voluntary associations and faith groups to 
identify potential volunteers; and having a cohort of ‘disaster-ready’ volunteers in every 
community.  Suggestions had in common that they were attempts to combine the most 
advantageous elements of spontaneous volunteering with some degree of selection, 
management or control to mitigate the known drawbacks of SV involvement in disaster 
responses. 
2. A Conceptual Model 
Our findings suggest that the paradox itself can be understood as a product of four key 
elements which interplay at the time of the occurrence of a disaster episode (Figure 2).   
Within each of the elements are a number of variables which can be seen as choices or 
dilemmas for ORs.  From our data, we suggest that interaction between the four identified 
elements determines the behaviour of ORs and SVs in times of disaster (Ajzen, 1991) and 
how they may be involved in practice in the response.  
[Figure Two about here] 
Element One is the ‘operating culture’ within which the response is made. This may include 
specific guidelines for disasters, or simply local custom and practice, about how SVs should 
be received; ranging from outright rejection or deflection, through tolerance of freelancing, to 
acceptance and incorporation into the official response. Attitude of ORs is also relevant; a 
welcoming atmosphere for SVs may help to set the tone for productive cooperation between 
SVs and ORs.  Culture may also include the degree of social pressure from media and 
politicians for SVs to be involved.  
Element Two in our model is the ‘management approach’ of the ORs.  The latter may be 
totally unprepared for the convergence of SVs or, at the other extreme, the involvement of 
SVs may have been an integral part of their strategic planning; in which case they may be 
confidently welcomed and integrated.  Where the involvement of SVs is accepted as part of 
the approach to managing  an unplanned event, there may be a preference for incorporating 
the SVs in a collaborative manner or the approach may be to keep SVs at arms-length and not 
accountable to ORs.  Either way, managers will decide whether or not to monitor SVs’ work. 
Finally, the management style of the ORs may be of the ‘command and control’ variety, with 
a wish to keep SVs accountable and doing prescribed tasks, or it may be more hands-off and 
empowering, with a preference for giving as much discretion as possible.   
Related to the management approach is Element Three which includes matters to do with task 
allocation within the overall official response.  Here a key variable is risk tolerance of ORs.  
We found a range from zero tolerance of risk to SVs and the population, through to a more 
open acceptance of risk in the context of an overall response.  A second variable relates to 
criteria used for task prioritisation. The approach of ORs may be to scan the area and identify 
needs and where SVs could help, or they may use a pre-set schema for which tasks SVs may 
be permitted to engage with.   
Element Four relates to the ‘volunteering and community context’.  The study has shown 
how SVs may be seen by ORs as a resource to be invited and ‘used’ by ORs as and when 
needed; or, at the other extreme, they may be seen as having an entitlement to participate in 
the response as they are the heart of the community, able to guide and advise the ORs about 
needs and priorities and access to further local resources.  There is also the issue of how 
flexible SVs are; will they accept a task from ORs or are they self-directed, willing only to do 
a task that they want to do irrespective of ORs’ judgement about its appropriateness? Linked 
to this is the motivation for SVs to respond; whether it is to ‘self-actualise’ (in which case 
they may stop volunteering when their own needs are met) or whether it is community-
focussed.   
In a disaster episode, we suggest, the involvement/exclusion paradox plays out in the 
interaction between the four elements; and the behaviour of both ORs and SVs will be 
affected by numerous variables which also interact with each other.  This helps to explain the 
wide variation we found in the study between behaviour within and between different flood 
episodes.    
3. Implications for Managers in Disaster Response Situations 
The Conceptual Model helps to explain the inclusion/exclusion paradox, and points to the 
numerous interacting elements behind any one manifestation of the paradox.  It will, we 
hope, be useful for OR managers before and after disaster episodes in teasing out variables to 
be taken into account when considering the SV involvement question.   
For those managers seeking to make quick policy decisions at the time of convergence of 
SVs in disaster situations, our study suggests five principles for involving SVs. 
A. Anticipate convergence of SVs (e.g., plan principles for involvement and risk 
assessment; consider risk mitigation; have a system for greeting and noting contact 
details; avoid immediate rejection)  
B. Avoid thinking that the only choices are to exclude or to incorporate SVs into the 
official response (e.g., consider tasks with low risk; consider tasks which the 
community can organise with minimal official management; assess the resources 
inherent in the local community) 
C. Be aware of the possible need for ‘surge capacity’ which cannot be met by official 
responders. 
D. Consider community characteristics (e.g., what resources does it have to aid the 
response; what helping capacities is it exhibiting; how can the community work with 
the official responders for mutual benefit; what approaches to SVs and the community 
now will assist long term recovery.) 
E. Manage SV expectations (e.g., explain likely additional resource needs, tasks and 
time scales) 
4. Study Generalizability and Future Research  
We are necessarily cautious in our claims about the generalizability of our findings and our 
conceptual model.  As regards applicability beyond the flood response case, our findings are 
likely applicable to other disaster situations in which there is a hazard element and in which 
local people have high motivation to help.  The latter, as our paper shows, is likely to be a 
function of factors such as community solidarity, empathy with the victims of disaster, 
community resources, and judgements about the adequacy of the official response. 
Do our findings have applicability beyond the UK?   Countries vary as to their official 
disaster response systems and therefore in the expected roles of governmental and non-profit 
agencies (Alexander, 2002; Waugh and Streib, 2006).  Countries also vary in their cultures of 
volunteering and in the policy expectations on spontaneous volunteers in time of disaster 
(Hustinx et al., 2010).  Nevertheless, our study has potential interest beyond the UK in that it 
has practical implications for those who are obliged to manage disaster situations; a matter of 
universal concern.    
Future research could consider the applicability of our model to other international and 
volunteering contexts.  It might also consider other hazard contexts to which the 
involvement/exclusion paradox might apply; for example, offers to care for children or other 
vulnerable people.  Research might also consider the applicability of our findings and model 
to situations where ‘surge capacity’ is needed for relatively short periods; for example, to 
help settle new migrants.  
Finally 
We began this paper by pointing to the contradictory pressures evident in disaster 
management where spontaneous volunteers ‘converge’.   Our study of English winter floods 
episodes points to a range of possible resolutions to a new aspect of the management of 
volunteers – which we call ‘the involvement/exclusion paradox’.  The conceptual model 
which we have developed is intended to aid understanding of the complexity of the forces 
underpinning the paradox and the ways in which they may be interrelated; a form of ‘useable’ 




(1) We follow Alexander (2002) in this paper and use the term ‘disaster’ to refer to large 
and widespread emergencies involving substantial destruction. They may also be 
mass-casualty events. Alexander (2002, p.1) defines an emergency “as an exceptional 
event that exceeds the capacity of normal resources and organization to cope with it”. 
He distinguishes four levels: “The lowest level involves those cases … which are 
subject to the routine dispatch of an ambulance or a fire appliance”. The second level 
are larger emergencies that require response by a municipality, the third level requires 
regional resources to be coordinated, and the fourth level require intervention by the 
national government.   
  
References  
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behaviour. Organizational Behaviour and Human 
Decision Making Processes, 50, 170-211. 
Alexander, D.  (2002). Principles of Emergency Planning and Management.  Edinburgh: Terra 
Publishing.  
Barsky, L.E., Trainor, J.E., Torres, M.R., & Aguirre, B.E. (2007). Managing volunteers: 
FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue programme and interaction with unaffiliated responders 
in disaster response. Disasters, 31 (4), 495-507. 
Baxter-Tomkins, T., & Michelle, W. (2009). Recruitment and Retention of Volunteers in 
Emergency Services. Australian Journal on Volunteering, 14, 39-49. 
British Red Cross. (2010). Guidance for Managing Convergent Volunteers. London: British 
Red Cross. 
Britton, N.R. (1991). Permanent Disaster Volunteers: Where Do They Fit? Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 20 (4), 395-414 
Cadieux, R. (2014). Team Leadership  in High-Hazard Environments. Farnham, Gower 
Cameron, D. (2014). Speech of the British Prime Minister at Flood Volunteers Reception. 
London: Downing Street 7 April https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/flood-volunteers-
reception-david-camerons-speech 
Chikoto, G.L., Sadiq, A-A., & Fordyce, E. (2012). Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness: 
Comparison of Nonprofit, Public and Private Organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 42 (2), 391-410. 
Cluckey, L. (2010). Transformative experiences for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disaster 
volunteers. Disasters, 34 (3), 644-656. 
Coles, J., Zhuang, J. & Yales, J. (2012). Case Study in Disaster Relief: A Descriptive 
Analysis of Agency Partnerships in the Aftermath of the Jan 12 2010 Haitian Earthquake. 
Social-Economic Planning Sciences, 46 (1), 67-77. 
Cone, D.C., Weir, S.D., & Bogucki, S. (2003). Convergent volunteerism.  Annals of 
Emergency Medicine, 41 (4), 457-462. 
Coston, J, Cooper, T.& Sundeen, R. (1993). Response of Community Organizations to the 
Civil Unrest in Los Angeles. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 22 (4), 357-373.  
Darley, J.M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander Intervention in Emergencies. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 8 (4), 377-382. 
Drabek, T.E., & McEntire, D.A. (2003). Emergent phenomena and the sociology of disaster: 
lessons, trends and opportunities from the research literature. Disaster Prevention and 
Management, 12 (2), 97-112. 
Dynes, R., & Quarantelli, E.L. (1980). Helping behaviour in large scale disasters. In Smith, 
D. H., & Macaulay, J. (Eds). Participation in Social and Political Activities. (First edition). 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Dyregrov, A., Kristoffersen, J.I., & Gjestad, R. (1996). Voluntary and Professional Disaster-
Workers: Similarities and Differences in Reactions. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 9 (3), 541-
555. 
Fernandez, L.S., Barbera, J.A. & van Dorp, J.R. (2006). Strategies for managing volunteers 
during incident response: A systems approach. Homeland Security Affairs, 2 (3), 1-15. 
Forbes, K. & Zampelli, E. (2014). Volunteerism: The Influences of Social, Religious and 
Human Capital. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 43 (2), 227-253. 
Fritz, C., & Mathewson, J. (1957). Convergence behaviour in disasters. National Research 
Council Disaster study #9. Washington, DC:  National Academy of Science. 
Gioia, D.A., Corley,K.G., & Hamilton, A.L. (2012). Seeking Qualitative Rigor in Inductive 
Research: Notes on the Gioia Methodology. Organizational Research Methods, 16 (1), 15-
31. 
Glaser, B.G., & Strauss, A. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. Chicago, IL: Aldine. 
Hustinx, L., Handy, F., Cnaan, R., Brudney, J., Pessi, A. & Yamauchia, N. (2010). Social and 
Cultural Origins of Motivations to Volunteer. International Sociology, 25,(3), 349-382.   
Jaffe, E., Sasson, U., Knobler, H., Aviel, E. & Goldberg, A. (2012). Volunteers and the Risk 
of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Nonprofit Management and Leadership 22 (3), 367-377 
JRF (2014). A Can-Do Approach to Community Action: What Role for Risk, Trust and 
Confidence? York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Kendra, J.M., & Watchendoft, T. (2003). Elements of Resilience After the World Trade 
Center Disaster: Reconstituting New York City’s Emergency Operations Centre. Disasters, 
27(1), 37-53. 
Lavine, M., & Thompson, K. (2004). Identity, Place, and Bystander Intervention: Social 
Categories and Helping After Natural Disasters. Journal of Social Psychology, 144 (4), 229-
245. 
Lee, Y.J. & Brudney, J. (2012). Participation in Formal and Informal Volunteering: 
Implications for Volunteer Recruitment. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 23 (2), 159-
180. 
Lowe, S., & Fothergill, A. (2003). A need to help: Emergent volunteer behavior after 
September 11th. in Monday, J. L. (Ed.), Beyond September 11th: An Account of Post-
Disaster Research. (pp. 293–314). Boulder, CO: Natural Hazards Center, University of 
Colorado. 
Michel, L.M. (2007). Personal Responsibility and Volunteering after a Natural Disaster: The 
Case of Hurricane Katrina. Sociological Spectrum, 27, 633-652. 
Milofsky, C. (2013). Disasters and Resilience in Rural Communities. Paper prepared for the 
annual meeting of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary 
Action. November 21, 2013.Hartford CT.  
Nichols, G., Goel, R., Nichols, T., &Jones, W. (2014). Volunteers in British Mountain 
Rescue: Responding to Increasing Demand for Rescues and a Changed Relationship with the 
State. Voluntary Sector Review, 5 (2), 213-229. 
Nolte, I & Boenigk, S. (2013). A Study of Ad Hoc Network Performance in Disaster 
Response. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42 (1), 148-173. 
Pelling, M., &High, C. (2006). Understanding adaptation: What can social capital offer 
assessments of adaptive capacity? Global Environmental Change, 15 (4), 308-319. 
Penning-Rowsell, E., Johnson, C., & Tunstall, S. (2006). ‘Signals’ from pre-crisis discourse: 
Lessons from UK flooding for global environmental policy change? Global Environmental 
Change, 16 (4), 323-339. 
Points of Light Foundation (no date). Managing Spontaneous Volunteers in Times of 
Disaster: The Syngergy of Structure and Good Intentions. Washington, DC: Points of Light 
Foundation. 
Quarantelli, E.L. (1989). How Individuals and Groups React During Disasters: Planning and 
Managing Implications for EMS Delivery. Preliminary Paper #138. Delaware: University of 
Delaware Disaster Research Centre. 
Rotolo, T., & Berg, J.A. (2010). In Times of Need: An Examination of Emergency 
Preparedness and Disaster Relief Service Volunteers. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 40 (4), 740-750. 
Sauer, L.M., Catletta, C., Tosatto, R. & Kirscha, T.D. (2014). The Utility of and Risks 
Associated with the use of Spontaneous Volunteers in Disaster Response: A Survey. Disaster 
Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 8 (1), 65-69. 
Schwarzenegger, A. & Renteria, H.R. (2001). They will come: Post-disaster volunteers and 
local governments. Los Angeles, CA: Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, Earthquake 
Program State of California. 
Shaw D, Eden C & Ackermann F (2009). Mapping causal knowledge: How managers 
consider their environment during meetings. International Journal of Management and 
Decision Making. 10 (5-6), 321-340. 
Shaw, D., Scully, J., & Hart, T. (2014). The paradox of social resilience: How cognitive 
strategies and coping mechanisms attenuate and accentuate resilience. Global Environmental 
Change. 25, 194-203. 
Shaw D, Smith CM, Hieke G, Harris M & Scully J (2015). Spontaneous volunteers: 
Involving citizens in the response and recovery to emergencies. Final report. Project: 
FD2666. London: Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs.. 
Stallings, R.A., & Quarantelli, E.L. (1985). Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency 
Management. Public Administration, 45, 93-100. 
Steffan, S.L., & Fothergill, A. (2009). 9/11 Volunteerism: A pathway to personal healing and 
community engagement. The Social Science Journal, 46, 29-46.  
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures 
for developing grounded theory. (2nd ed.) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Tierney, K. (2003). Conceptualizing and Measuring Organizational and Community 
Resilience: Lessons from the Emergency Response Following the September 11, 2001 Attack 
on the World Trade Center. Preliminary Paper #329. Delaware: University of Delaware 
Disaster Research Centre. 
Vigoda, E. (2002). From Responsiveness to Collaboration: Governance, Citizens, and the 
Next Generation of Public Administration. Public Administration Review, 62 (5), 527-540. 
Waugh, W. & Streib, G. (2006). Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency 
Management. Public Administration Review 66, S131-140 
Wilson, J. (2012). Volunteerism Research: A Review Essay. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 41(2), 176-212. 
Wolensky, R.P. (1979). Toward a Broader Conceptualization of Volunteerism in Disaster. 
Journal of Voluntary Action Research,  8, 33-42. 
  
Author Biographies 
Margaret Harris Ph.D. is Emeritus Professor of Voluntary Sector Organisation at Aston 
Business School, UK and Visiting Professor at Birkbeck, University of London. Her research 
focuses on management and organisational issues in the voluntary and non-profit sector. She 
received the ARNOVA Distinguished Achievement and Leadership Award in 2011 
Duncan Shaw Ph.D., D.S.c is Professor of Operations & Critical Systems at Manchester 
Business School, UK. His research focuses on decision-making processes and effective 
operations, particularly in the context of disasters and emergencies. 
Judy Scully, Ph.D. is Senior Lecturer in Work and Organisational Psychology at Aston 
Business School, UK. Her research focuses on health and social policy, knowledge 
management, HR management and social resilience.  
 
Chris M Smith, Ph.D. is a Lecturer in Critical Systems and Operations at the Alliance 
Manchester Business School, UK. His research focuses on applying systems methods to 
enhance operational and strategic decision-making in an emergency context.  
Graham Hieke, Ph.D. is a Research Fellow at the University of Surrey, UK. His research 
focuses on organisational responses to issues of health and well-being, particularly within the 
context of the emergency services. 
 
  
 Figure 1. The Findings and Themes 
 
 Figure 2: Explaining the involvement/exclusion paradox of spontaneous volunteering 
 
 
